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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GLORIA G. FENTON,

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

Case No. 10238

CEDAR LUMBER & HARD~WARE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defen~ant

and A ppella;n,t

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title action by the Plaintiff-Respondent to quiet the title to certain property in Cedar City,
Utah.· The Defendant-Appellant filed a Cross Complaint
to quiet title to the same property in the defendant.

' IN LOWER COURT
DISPOSITION
The lower court found the issues for the plaintiff
and rendered a Decree quieting title to the disputed
property in the plaintiff-respondent. There was no trial
in the lower court and instead the case was submitted
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to the court upon the .pleadings,. a~ exhibit consisting
of an abstract of title to the property and a stipulation of facts entered into by counsel.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON._APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the lo\ver court and directing the lower
court to enter a Decree quieting· title to the disputed
property in the defendant.
ST~L\_TE1IENT

OF FACTS

This case was never tried but. was submitted
to the
.
lower court on the pleadings, an abstract of title to the
disputed property, written interrogatories and answers
thereto, and a stipulation of facts entered into by counseL ~rhe facts are that prior to 1942 one Kate Wallace
was the o·w·ner of approximately 5.9 acres of land in
Cedar City, Utah, including the disputed property. In
1942 Kate .wallace conveyed to one Alice Srnith, a predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, part of the plaintiff's property and in 1943 conveyed the remainder also
to a predecessor in ti tie of the plaintiff. . Tpese deeds
from !{ate Wallace commenced at the northeast corner
of the tracts conveyed arid then· ran west to ''a public
road as platted on .Plat" A of the plat of said property
and·adjoining· property made by Theron Ashcroft, thence
south along said east ·line of ·said road . . . '' In 1946
and. again in November of 1950 correction deeds were
•'
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executed by Kate Wallace of the same property to the
same grantees for the reason that the 1942 and 1943
deeds had a wrong starting place a:nd were therefore
erroneous. The 1.942 and 1943 deeds are shown at pages
27 and 28 of the abstract of title and the correction
deed of November, 1950, is shown at page 38 of the
abstract. It is clear, however, that these later deeds
were only correction deeds of the same property.
In July of 1944 this same Kate vVallace conveyed
all of the remainder of her 5.9 acre~, except the ''street''
area hereinafter referred to, to predecessors in interest
of the defendant so that at that date, of the original
tract of 5.9 acres, Kate Wallace only retained one tract
of land, 66 feet wide and 150 feet deep, the east two
rods of which is the property in dispute. On March 15,
1950, Kate Wallace conveyed this last 66 feet by·150 feet
tract by Warranty Deed to Cedar City, a Municipal
Corporation. Right after the description of the tract
is the clause, "the ~above property ris to be used for.
street and no other purpose.'' (Italics added).
Cedar City did not open up this property as a public street, however, and ·in fact it has never been opened
or used as a public street, never has been a part of the
Cedar City street system and has never appeared on
any map or plat as a street. In fact it had never been
a street prior to the March 15, 1950 deed to Cedar City
from Kate Wallace and was never a public road as was
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referr~d ·to

in the Kate· Wallace deeds to plaintiff's·
predecessors in 1942, 1943 and again in November of
1950. In fact there is no Plat A by Theron Ashcroft
or anyo~e else. Therefore., we have a situation of both
the public road and plat ref erred to in the deeds to
pllijntiff 's predecessors as actually never existing. Instead, the property conveyed to Cedar City as a street
and also the property on the east of the street conveyed
to plaintiff's predeGessors and also that on the west of
the . street conveyed to defendant's predecessors remained unimproved farming property having a potential
value as residential property, which in fact it now is.
As early as August 14, 1951, it became somewhat obvious that Cedar City was not going to open up a street
at the prop~rty because on that date, Kate Wallace quitclaimed this same 66 feet by 150 feet tract to the defendant. Right after the description of the property is
the .clause :
"It is tb~ intention of the grantor to convey
all right, title and interest which grantor may own
in the above property, heretofore conveyed to
Cedar City Corporation for a street, in the event
Cedar City Corporation vacates said street."
In Jannary of 1952 Cedar City accepted from the
defendant a subdivision of all.the property they ~ad acquired from Kate Wallace lying south and west of the
''street'' property kno'vn as the ''Valley Circle Subdiyision,'' which subdivision did not make use of the street
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IJroperty previously conv-eyed to Cedar ·city but
had other streets to serve the subdivision.

inst~ad

The street property, consisting ot a tract 66 feet
wide and 150 feet long, remained unopened and unused
as a street for approximately ten years. -.In 1960 Cedar
City passed an ordinance closing and vacating the
''street'' even though it had never been opened and
used as a street. No person, including the parties or
their predecessors, objected to· the closing and all parties
concerned have proceeded on the theory that the street
is now effectively closed. No public or private easement in a· street is asserted or claimed and the only
question now to be decided is, ''who owns this 'street'
property, the Plaintiff-Respondent, who is the abutting
o'vner on one side, or the Defendant-Appellant, who
acquired the. street property from the former owner?''
The west two rods of the street property is not in dispute and is owned by the appellant and We are only
rods or the half of the
concerned with the east t1vo
''
street adjoining the property of the plaintiff.
1

.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHEN A PUBLIC STREET IS VACATED, THE LAND THAT
WAS STREET REVERTS TO THE OWNER OF THE FEE
IN THE STREET AND NOT TO ABUTTING LAND OWNER
UNLESS HE ALSO OWNS THE FEE IN THE STREET.

At the outset, it should be stated that throughout
this brief the 'vords ''street,'' ''closing and vacating the
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street,'' ''abutting upon the street,'' and other like references to a street are used. However, a street actually
never" existed, either physically on the ground or by
map or plat, and therefore these words are used advisedly. · Even though this brief is concerned with the ownership of the street property, .conveyances of property
with- reference· to or abutting upon the street and other
like principles, actually none of these principles of law
is applicable as .a street really never has existed. However, it is felt that the Court, in the last analysis, will
want to decide this case on its merits and this brief is
written much as it would have been had there actually
bHen a s~reet.. But by so doing, the appellant is not conceding that there was a street and it is not abandoning
i,ts· claim that we are here concerned only with the ownership of a tract of la:nd of building- lot size. and the
law pe-rtaining to streets and_ the ownership of land in
the street has nothing to do with the case.
The plaintiff has presented this case on the theory
that whenever a City vacat~s a public street, the land
which was street automatically becomes the property of
the abutting land owner; that by the act of simply vacating the street, the abutting owner, ipso facto, became the
0"\Vner of. the street and that this is SO even' though there
really had never been ·a street~· This theory , is made
clear in the Answers to Interrogatories, stipulation of
facts and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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entered in this case. The defendant submitted to the
plaintiff written interrogatories, one of which asked the
plaintiff to set forth the nat~~e of her claim to the street.
The plaintiff ans_wered in_ her answer to Interrogatory
No. 3 that ''the entire claim of the plaintiff to the two
rods ... is based upon acquiring a deed from plaintiff's
immediate. predecessor in interest who was the owner
of the property to the east of the t~o rods in question
at such time as Cedar City Corporation abandoned same
for a street and the entire claim of the plaintiff is based
upon succeeding to whatever interest this person had,
and is based entirely upon the rights of an adjoining
property owner to land held for a street at such time
as the public body abandons said street or road.'' Likewise this claim is set forth in the stipulation of facts
submitted to the. court wherein the.: stipulation states
that the ''claim of the plaintiff to the land in question
is based upon her being a successor in interest to the
parties who owned the property immediately to the east
of said street at the time of said vacation of said street
by Cedar City."

In the court's- Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law the plaintiff's theory 1s approved
as Finding No. 17 provides as follows :
''The plaintiff's predecessors in title and interest, o'vning and holding the property abutting
the said street on the east side thereof at the time
it was vacated by Cedar City approximately ten
years after being received by Cedar City, had the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. ,. east side. of ~aid street. revert and revest in themse1ves . . . " .
But- the ·city, by: merely closing a street; creates no
legal rights in .the street, but only -relieves the land of
a·burden. It is not the law now and never has been that
a city, -by vacating a street, creates any property rights
in. th~ abutting land owner or for that matter in the
original land owner. It is the law as established
almost
\
unaniinotisly·;by the case~ that upon the closing of a
street, the land ~vhich was. a streei- goes to the owner of
the fee ·in- the street. ·The plaintiff has entirely missed
the crux of this case by not making an effort to show
that she also owns the -fee in th"e street or at least the
east two ·rods· thereof. It should be noted that at no
time has -~the 'plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the
fee to ha1f the street, but only th:at she was the owner
of th~e abutting property and 'th-e Court has found that
the plaintiff was- the owner of the abutting property and
·in fact tliis ·has never· beGn questioneJ. But the Courlf
did not find that the plaintiff was the o-u,ner of the .fee
to half the street.- The plaintiff has ignored this complete~y and has presented this case on the theory that
the closing of the street by the City places the fee to the
east· half of the street in the plaintiff. But the closing

oi

the street has nothing to.. do "'ith where the fe~ _is,

but instead it__'is the conveyances ·by the own~rs of the

property which ,determines \Vh~re the fee is and from
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them, it· could only be with.- -the defendant.- 'The law
which holds that upon closing of a street, the .land goes
to the owner of. the fee· is set forth in 25 Am. Jur., ·page424, as follows :

"Rights with respect to the reversion of title
upon the abandonment or vacation of a highway
depend, in the absence of st~tutory provision, upon
the ownership of the fee. The general rule is to
the effect that where the absolute and unqualified
fee is in the municipality or other public agency,
it divests the original owner of his entire interest,
so that upon-:. -dis~ontin~ance of the way as.: such,
the title does not revert to the grantor .or the
abutting owner, but remains in the municipality or
other agen~y unaffected by the vacation. ·where
a mere easement of use as a public highway is
taken or granted so that the fee of the soil remains in the original own~r, the vacation or discontinuance of the highway as such restores exclusive possession thereof to such owner, or his
successor· or assigns.''

A number of Utah cases follow the above· rule, notably Knioht vs. '1 hornas, 101 Pac. 3'83, · 35 [Jtah 470,
which held that ''when the street is vacated, the right
to occupy and use the land belongs· to .him in. who the
fee -is-the City, or the original land owner if it was reserved by him and not conveyed~ or to t~e abutting property owner and the land is subject to all the use·. and enjoyment ·and burdens of other lands.''
1

.

'

Therefore, it was error for the lower court to 'find ·
and rule that ·upon th({ vacating of a public· street, the
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street automatically. goes to the abutting property own-·
er. It is admitted, that if the. abutting property owner
also happened to own the fee in the street, then such
'vould be the case but not other~wise. As hereinafter
pointed out, the abutting propertY. owner could not have
be~.n the owner , of the fee and . therefore, it was error
for the court to grant to the abutting owner the title to
half the .street.
POINT II
A CITY ORDINANCE VACATING A STREET CAN PASS
.NO TITLE TO THE FEE IN. THE STREET.

It should be noted· that the lower court has taken
the. position that all that is necessary in order to succeed .to the property that once was street is to be an
abutting property owner upon the vacating of the street.
Findings of Fact No. 17 so provides. But this finding
or no other finding by the court ;was to the effect that
the abutting owner also o'vned the. fee in the street and
in fact the Findings and the claims of the plaintiff are
silent. on this important fact. To merely find that the
plaintiff or her predecessors, was the owner of the abutting property on the east at the time the street was vacated _means. nothing. -In order to entitle the plaintiff
to the street or the east half of it, the court must of necessity also find that this abutting owner also owned
the fee to the half of the .street now claimed.

It is obvious froiD. the Findings and Conclusions
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that the lower court decided this case on the theory that
(1) when Kate Wallace conveyed the street property to
Cedar City in March of 1950, she parted with all her
ownership and title; Finding No. 16 so provides; ( 2) that
since she had parted with her property, her deed of
August, 1951, of the same property to the defendant was
a .nullity and conveyed nothing as Finding 'No. 16 also
so provides ; ( 3) therefore, Cedar City held title to the
property and ( 4) by enacting the vacating ordinance in
1960, the street property automatically ''reverted and
vested'' in the abuttin,g property owner. But this entire theory is fallacious and untenable. In the first
place, how can Kate Wallace's deed of Ma!.ch 15, 1950,
be said to divest her of all interest in the property~ It
is clear that she conveyed only an easement or_ some
other limited estate or interest, else why did she attach
the clause ''the above property is to be used_ for street
and no other purpose"? _ What if Kate Wallace had instead put_ in her deed ''only an easement for a public
street over the above prop~rty is hereby conveyed and
if Cedar City never opens up a street, o~ if opened and
later vacated, the property shall revert to the grantor'' 1
Could it then be said that Kate Vvallace parted with all
her interest in the property? But as a pra-ctical matter,
does not her language say the same thing? After the
City received this deed in 1950, could the city have used
this property for a park, a public building or some other.
purpose? The City most certainly could have- done if
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it had received the full interest 1n the property. Or
suppose Kate Wallace had more clearly set out her
restriction on future use of the property and then the
·City passed an ordinance vacating the street and in .addition conveyed the street property to the abutting o'vner .. Would this owner have gotten the title~ Clearly
the abutting owner would not have as this would be
entirely contrary to the expressed intent of the original
g·1•antor ·which· would be to ·reserve in herself the fee.
Furthermore, if Kate vVallace did part with the full
interest in the property as the court has so found, then
how could the act of adopting an ordinance closing the
street pass any· title to the abutting owner~ An ordinance cannot serve as an instrument of conveyance. If
the City actually got the full interest in the street property, or owned the fee, then after closing the street by
ordinance, the· City would own the street and would
have to· convey the property to the abutting owner by
deed. The Utah case of Knight rs. Thomas, supra, establishes this. But there is no such conveyance here and
none is claimed.

It should be perfectly clear to anyone that when
Kate Wallace conveyed the land in question to Cedar
City but then put in her deed the clause, "the above
property to be used .for street and no other purpose,''
she was only ··conveying a public easement and was reserving_ to herself the fee. This is the only possible
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interpretation that can be. put upon these words.· If
there is any possible doubt as to. the intention of Kate
Wallace, this should be dispelled .by her deed only a
year and a half later of the. same ·property to ·the
defendant, ~which deed carried the clause ~'It is the ·in-_
tention of the grantor to convey all right, title and interest which grantor may own in the above property,
heretofore conveyed to Cedar_ -City Corporation for a
street, in the event Cedar City Corporation vacatef? said
street.'' This is page 39 of the abstract of title ..
The case of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, 102 Pac.
7 40, 36 Utah 257, is a leading case on this subject, and
shows that a land O"\\~er, in granting to a city or
other public body, land for a street, may reserve the
fee. In that case it was held that a "grantor in granting an easement may restrict his conveyance by apt
words to the precise parcel of land intended to be conveyed and he may reserve to himself the title to that
portion of the land within the street subject to the public easement and if it appears that such "\\ aS the intention of the parties, the intentjon will prevail and the
land in the street, in case it is vacatefl, will revert to
the grantor and not to the a hutting owner.'' .
7

As stated previously the lower court's theory of
this case is that Cedar (;ity held the full title to the
street property and that by adopting the closing ordinance the fee automatically reverted and vested in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
abutting o'vner without any further conveyance. But as
shown above, upon closing the street, the property would
go to the owner of the fee and yet the plaintiff has made
no -effort to show that she also O:\\rned the fee in the
street and the Findings do not state that the plaintiff
also owned the fee and thus the Findings are clearly insufficient to support the Decree. It is submitted that
this is the glaring error in this case.
POINT

II~

THE RULE THAT A CONVEYANCE OF LAND ABUTTING
UPON A STREET ALSO CONVEYS TO THE CENTER OF
THE STREET HAS NO APPLICATION WHEHE THERE IS
NO STREETt EITHER OPEN AND IN USE OR EXISTING
BY MAP OR PLAT.

It ~hould be noted from the abstract of title submitted that none of the conveyances to the plaintiff's
predecessors ever expressly convey the street property.
In fact the west line of the property conveyed is the
east line of the ''street.'' Therefore, how can the plaintiff claim any title to the street property~ It is submitted that the only possible claim to the street property is by the application of a doctrine of law completely
ignored by the plaintiff, '""hich is that a conveyance of
land abutting upon a street or hig·hway actually conveys
to the. center of the street or highway providing the
grantor owns the fee in the street and providing no
contrary intention is sho;wn. Although this· theory was
not raised or relied upon below, the appellant is placed
·in. a position where it may .l>e necessary to· refute it.
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blince, ·it is. clearly. not ap-plicable 1n this case anyway;
the undersigned begs the indulgence of -the, C-ourt to
point out why it is. not applicable~; ·in the event it is·
attempted to be relied. upon in this appeal by the· ·Respondent.
It is the common law rule tha:t a conveyance of land·
abutting upon a street also carries to- the. center of the
street. It is based upon a presumption and its application carries actually more property than is described in
the deed. Utah has enacted this common law rule ·by
statute, being Section 27.;.1-7, Utah C·ode, which is as follows~

"By taking or accepting land for· a highway
the public acquires only the right of 'vay and incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it.
A transfer of land bounded by a highway passes
the title of the person whose estate is transferred
to the middle of the highway."
Th~

above section "\Vas actually repealed by the Legislature _in 1963 and a new section, 27-12-101 substituted,
but all the facts involved in this case ~would be applicable to the old section, however. The above section is
only declaratory of the common law as held by Utah
cases, including the case of Hummel vs. Yo~tng, 265 Pac.
2d· 410,' ;1 Utah 2d 237, :which shows· that there is one
qualification to the last· sentence of the above statute
'
which. is that the grantor must first own the fee in the
street· before he can convey it. This case states· that
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"at common law, a private conveyance of land· bounded
by or abutting on a highway., the fee to which belongs
to the abutting o:wner, is presumed to convey the fee to
the highway and to the center thereof.'' Before the
plaintiff's predecessor, who owned the abutting propertly at th~ time Cedar City vacated the street, could
con.vey any interest in the street, that predecessor must
have first acquired the fee in the street by deed because the closing of the. street by ordinance would give
him nothing. It is also submitted that when the statute
says
that a transfer
of land bounded by a highway
.
.
(italics added} it means there must actually be a highw~y. It is. submitted that a necessary and indispensable
ingred.ieD:t of the common law rule and the above section of. our code is. that there must be a highway or
street..·and ·if there is none, then the common law rule
or the above Statute would have absolutely no application. . Furthermore, this. statute has nothing to do with
who owns a street u.pori its vacation as· it says nothing
..

about ·this and all it does ·say is that a transfer of
land bounded by a highway transfers to the center.
Section 27~1-7 also points up another. important fact

which is that if there is any doubt that Cedar City only
obtained, from Kate vVallace an easement, this section
should dispel any such doubt -.as it affirmatively establishes that the City only obtained· an easement. In the
lig4.t: of thi~ statute, even ·'vithout the limiting language
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in .the: deed of Kate Wallace to Cedar City: in ·1950;-ho:\V
could the court find that the City received, from Kate
Wallace full title and ownership in ~the property,?
But this common law rule or ·the above section

of

our code has absolutely no· application in this case.
There never was a street, either physically on 'the
ground or by plat or map, and this is a necessary pre~
requisite to the application of this rlile of law. During
all the times ·involved in this action, the ·''street'' in
question was actually unimproved property the same
as the property adjoining. There was nothing to indicate that it was a street and no one used it ·-as such. If
there was no street, how could any legal rights to th-e
street property flow to an abutting owner upon the closing of a non-existent street, or by a conveyance of prop~
erty appearing to abut -upon a street? It is admitted
that the books are 1iterally full of cases which hold that
upon the closing of a ··street, the street property goes
to the' abutting owners. ·But upon reading the cases it
is found that the abutting owner also happened to own
the fee in the street, and in all cases, ·there actually
'vas a street, open and in use, or at least existing by
official.map or plat.. Here there was neither and clearly this doctrine of Jaw would- have no. application .
. In fact the reasons. for_ this common law rule as
relied. upon by the_ courts are not even present in this
case.-_: Som~ of the courts in following this rule do so
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upon the theory that whenever a conveyance is made
with reference to a natural monument, be it a stream,
street, hedge, wall or post, it actually carries to the center of the monument. But what if there was no such
monument¥ However, the reason given for applying
this rule as followed by a majority of the courts is that
when a grantor conveys land abutting upon or with
reference to a street, the grantor actually intends to
convey all he owns because a narrow strip of land, consisting of half a street, in the event the street is later
vacated, would be of no use to him and yet would be of
considerable value to his grantee. Therefore, the grantor is presumed to have intended that his deed carry to
the middle of the street. But we do not have that situation here. Instead it will be noted that Kate VvTallace,
who originally owned the whole tract of approximately
5.9 acres, first conveyed out the property east of the
''street'' to plaintiff's predecessors. .....~t that time in
1942, she still 0"\\'1led the ''street'' property and also
all the remaining property to the west and south. It
is not a situation of Kate Wallace then only owning
the fee to the ''street'' so that upon its closing she
~ould only have a narro'v unusable strip of land, but
rather she owned a sizable tract adjoining on the. west.
How ·could it be said that K_ate Wallace actually intended to convey to plaintiff's predecessors an additional
2 rods of land which \Vould only haYe the effect of de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

creasing her larger tract by .that much~- .Therefor~, ,it
is clear. that the main reason given by the courts for
applying this rule is not here pres.ent.
Furthermore, it should be ·noted that at the. time
Kate Wallace conveyed the property to plaintiff's predecessors, the west line of which was the ''public road
as shown on Plat A of said property and adjoining
property made by Theron Ashcroft, ·then south along
the east line of said road . . ., '' there actually was no
Plat A and no road in existence and therefore, this was
not a situation of conveying property abutting upon .a
street which is always the situation in the cases adhering to this rule.
Therefore; it 1s the earnest contention of the defendant that even if the planitiff had r·elied upon this
doctrine of law to give her the fee to half the street in
question, it still would not be applicable. Thus, the only
possible theory upon which the plaintiff could sustain
a claim into the fee in the street fails.
POINT IV
AS TO WHETHER A GRANTOR CONVEYS THE FEE IN
A STREET BY A CONVEYANCE OF THE STREET OR BY
A CONVEYANCE OF ABUTTING PROPE.RTY DEPENDS
UPON THE INTENTION . AND THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES.

-The best reason for holding that Kate Wallace
never intended to part with the f~e in the street property or applying the common law rule is that from the
de~dfJ. and surrounding circumstances, it is clear Kate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20 . ~

Wallace intended otherwise. The common law rule is
only .a rule of presumption and if a co~trary contention
is shown by the grantor .in her deeds or in the surrounding ci~cumstances, that will prevail. Here Kate W allace, who is now deceased, made it abundantly clear
that she did not intend to part with the fee to the street
property when she conveyed the property abutting on
the east. A few years after deeding out the property
on the east to the plaintiff's predecessors, she then conveyed an easement in the street property to Cedar City.
It is clear that she intended to reserve the fee because
~he stated in her deed to Cedar City that the property
was to be used for street and for no other .purpose. This
evinces an i~tent on her part to hold the fee. Otherwise, why was not this deed to Cedar City a simple conveyance by warranty deed with no strings or conditions
at~ached ~
Then a year and a half later, in August,
1951, at which time no street had ever been opened or
in existence, she executed her deed to the defendant of
the identical ''street'' property and then following her
description of the property put in the clause "it is the
intent of the g-rantor to convey all right, title and interest in the above property heretofore conveyed to Cedar
City for a street in the event Cedar City vacates said
street.'' What could be clearer than at that time Kate
Wallace was intending to convey to the defendant the
fee in the street?
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As stated above the eommon law rule is' a rebuttable
presumption. There· are almosf as many cases rebutting
this presumption as there are which''follow it. It should
~

be noted that a strict. construction of any deed to ·property abutting upon a street would not include any. of
the street but· instead would only run to the street li:ne.
In other words it is to a certain extent a fiction and the
courts are very liberal in finding a contrary intention.
Perhaps the best case in which the presumption is rebutted happens to be a Utah case, the leading case of
Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, supra. This is a very
interesting case and should be · controlling here. There
a property owner owned a tract of land where the Union
Pacific Railroad yards are now located in Salt Lake
City. He opened up a · short street to serve the property and then divided it into building lots, fronting on
this street and he then commenced selliiJ.g the lots. A
year or so later, he conveyed to the same grantees, by
a separate conveyance, an easement in the street. The
street was open and used for a number ·of years as a
means of ingress and egress to the lots. Subsequently
the railroad acquired ·all ihe property abutting on· this
street for its yards and then claimed the land which·
had been the street. The necessity for such a street
ended when the r~ilroad acquired all the abutting property. The railroad claimed that since the abutting own·
ers had owned the fee in the· street by reason of their
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deeds of property· abutting upon the street, then the
railroad. acquired the. fee in the street by buying out the
abutting owners. The Court held otherwise, however,
stating that the original owner, by conveying to his
grantees separately an easement in the street a year or
so after the conveyance of the abutting property, showed
his intention to retain the fee in the street. This case
is very similar to the case at bar in that the clear intention of Kate Wallace throughout all of her deeds
was that the fee in the street had never passed and
that she owned it all the time.
Another revealing fact shows the intention of Kate
Wallace. It should be noted that she first conveyed out
the property on the east of the street to plaintiff's predecessors and then she conveyed the property on the
west of the street to defendant's predecessor. This left
her ._o"\\rning only a small tract, 66 feet wide and 150
feet . long, and obviously of building lot size. In fact
it is iqentical with the plaintiff's lot on the east and
also with the lot east of the plaintiff. Kate Wallace.
most certainly intended that the fee in the street would
remain with her and that if, for any reason, it was not
used for a street or if used and then vacated, this building lot would come back to her.
Forgetting for a moment the law involved in this
case, let us look at the equities. This case is plainly a
situation of the pla~ntiff attempting to ''get something
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for nothing."

The -common ·owner; !{ate

:wallace,~-

had

i

made it abundantly clear that she did not intend:to: divest herself of the fee until she did so to the defendant
in August of 1951, yet the plaintiff- is attempting~· to
acquire a six rod lot when· her grantor 'only had a ,four
rod lot and at the expense of a person who did every--·
thing she .could do to retain it to herself.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is the appellant's contention that
the plaintiff has completely missed the crux of this case .
by proceeding on the theory that Ce<;lar City actually
owned the title to the street property and that this_
automatically reverted to and vested in the abutting
owner upon the vacation of the street. That it has
never ~een the law that upon the closing of a street,
the land reverts to the abutting owner simply because
he is the abutting owner. That the law is that upon
closing a street, the land goes to the owner of the fee
in the street and the appellant has made no effort to
prove that she is the owner of the fee but rather it is
clear that the appellant is the o·wner and is now entitled
to full ownership of the property. Even though not
relied upon by the appellant, the doctrine that the grantor intends the grantee of abutting property take to the
center of the street has no application here because
there never was a street and even if there were, the
in1ent ·of- the parties as gathered · f'rom all the various
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deeds, effectively refutes the common law rule. In any
event, neither under the common law rule nor under the
plaintiff's theory can the plaintiff prevail because under
both theories there must be a street. Since there never
was a street, we .are actually not concerned with who
owns a street after the public body vacates it or for
that matter with the rights of abutting owners. Instead
we are only concerned with the ownership of adjoining
building lots, to be determined by the various conveyances from the common grantor, and from them it is
clear that the defendant-appellant is the owner of the
disputed property.
Respe·ctfully subm.itted,

IsoM,
Attorney for .Appellant.
ORVILLE
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